depending on their purchase histories or other characteristics. This practice beneficial to firms because it allows them to charge lower prices to acquire a consumers. However, when targets are favored, non-targeted customers "get Most firms practice target marketing, tailoring different offers to different customers is often seen as specific set of the short end of the stick." That is, they (a) pay more to receive the same quality or (b) they receive less utility than the favored customers despite paying the same price.
the popular press ged them a higher r experimenting with different prices for the same good . Victoria's Secret was sued for sending catalogs with different prices according to gender and zip code.
2 If an action intended to lure a target group s, managers may ine.
ditions under which managers should expect that their pursuit of a target group will repel non-targeted customers. But our key thesis is that there are cases in which non-targeted customers are e to some
In the follow sections first we review the reasons for consumers to be repelled by relative mistreatment, then provide a set of conditions where the reverse can occur, i.e., consumers are attracted to sellers who given them the get the short end of the stick. We then present the findings of five studies that provide support for this conclusion.
There may be a downside to this differential treatment. Accounts in show that consumers are vexed when they find out that companies have char price than some other group for the same good. Amazon.com was attacked fo 1 has the effect of repelling a (perhaps larger) set of non-targeted customer grossly over-estimate the net benefits of their promotions to the bottom l
We will show that, consistent with much academic research, there are con attracted when they notice that they are being given the short end of the stick relativ other customers who are better judges of quality.
Repelling Consumers by Relative Mistreatment
islike receiving a ature is that, counter the individual's perception of the item's value and its price, but also on the relative value of the item to others and price paid by others. Consequently, consumers may downgrade their utility for a product that pro een put forth for s judged less attractive when another segment receives a better deal, due to perceptions of "unfairness." In Thompson and Bazerman 1989; Rabin 2001) . Other work has examined moderators of unfairness reactions (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003; Campbell 1999; Darke and Dahl, 2003;  ho are uncertain of their preferences for a set of core products rely on perceptions of the fit of the sellers' promotional offers to them compared to the fit to others. Simonson, Carmon, and O'Curry (1994) gave consumers a choice between two core products (cake mixes). In some conditions, one cake mix was accompanied by a completely optional promotion (a collector's plate)
There is considerable support in the academic literature that customers d worse deal than some other group. The overwhelming consensus of this liter to standard utility theory, consumers' utility for an item is not only based on vides them relatively less benefit than others. Several explanations have b this phenomenon.
Fairness. One stream of research posits that a given offer to consumers i a) when their current service provider offers a better deal to switchers ("betrayal") and b) when another service provider rewards their loyal customers but the responde not ("jealousy"). Findings in behavioral economic on fairness show that ind equity to disadvantageous inequity (Andreoni, Brown and Vester Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2000) , but the sign of the effect is never reversed.
Idiosyncratic fit. Another relevant stream shows that consumers w presumably valued by others but not by participants; in other conditions, no promotion was e mix. Simonson the utility of the core brand but duct. Kivetz and Simonson (2003) re-interpret this finding under the broad rubric of an "idiosyncratic fit" heuristic that operates on the relative cost and benefit an individual stands to estrictions to dividual than for spondents who liked sushi were more likely to sign up for a loyalty program if one had to purchase 12 sandwich meals and 12 sushi meals to qualify than if one merely had to purchase 12 sandwich meals.
ioned studies, bout the promotion er explanation has or example consumers may infer that the cost of a promotion is embedded in the list price of the core product. If individuals find this promotion unattractive to them relative to others, they might ituation where the same 01; Lichtenstein, Burton, and O'Hara 1989; Raghubir, Inman, and Grande 2004; cf. Simonson et al. 1994 ).
We next show conditions under which consumers who are disadvantaged by the promotion make positive inferences about the value (quality) of the core product. Their subsequent choices show that consumers may be attracted to, rather than repelled by, a product offered. The promotion actually discouraged choice of the accompanying cak et al. conjecture that consumers are not altering their perception of instead using the promotion as a reason for rejecting the promoted pro obtain compared to other consumers. These authors show that adding costs or r loyalty programs can attract consumers if those costs are less onerous for the in another group of consumers. In one study, re
Quality inferences about the core product. In all of the above-ment consumers are not making inferences about the core product, but instead a itself, i.e., the promotion is unfair or it doesn't fit them well. However, anoth consumers using the promotional offer to infer the value of the core product. F infer that the core product is of lower value (overpriced) compared to a s product is sold to everyone without the promotion (Anderson and Simester 20 that offers better terms to another group. Thus, sellers may benefit by giving consumers the short Con motion discrimination among their customers in markets in which consumers are convinced that there are quality differences among products, but some cannot discern quality prior to purchase. Alba roducts that are
The quality and value of search goo erience good's quality prior to purchase (Ford, Smith, and Swasy 1987; Nelson 1970 Nelson , 1974 .
We posit that when a seller provides a better deal to a set of buyers who are perceived to be e romotion to
This can occur even when otion.
ice group will make positive inferences about quality. First, the disadvantaged consumers must have uncertainty about quality. Second, the advantaged consumers must be able to judge quality erchandise is low y for the seller to provide a promotion to lure the advantaged group to inspect the core product. Fourth, the uncertainty of disadvantaged consumers must be associated primarily with concerns about "more is better" attributes. All consumers desire higher levels of such attributes and differ only in their willingness to pay for these attributes. Such attributes are sometimes referred to as vertical end of the stick.
ditions for Attracting Consumers by Relative Mistreatment
We study the problem of firms practicing various forms of price or pro et al. (1997) point out that such a setting is common, because there are many p "search goods" for experts but "experience goods" for novices.
ds can be easily assessed prior to purchase. Consumers cannot assess an exp xperts in determining quality, a disadvantaged buyer might perceive this p provide a useful basis for inferring the quality level of the core brand.
the disadvantaged buyer does not observe the experts' response to the prom More specifically, we believe five conditions must be met before the nov sufficiently well prior to purchase so that they would not buy if the promoted m in quality. Third, the disadvantaged consumers must perceive that it is costl attributes (Tirole 1988) . This vertical aspect is needed since, if the attributes are matters of ers would e irrelevant to their to infer quality must be accessible and seem diagnostic to the novices (Dick, Chakravarti, and Biehal 1990; Ross and Creyer 1992; Simmons and Lynch 1991 (Broniarczyk and Alba 1994 ) and the effort they require. In our case, the inference than effort-
We believe these quality signal inferences that attract consumers will operate in parallel to mechanisms of idiosyncratic fit and fairness that repel consumers. Moreover, the strength of the effect of the quality signal on choice will depend on certain variables: consumers' uncertainty about quality, external and internal determinants of the salience of that uncertainty, and factors idiosyncratic taste -i.e., ideal point rather than vector attributes --novice consum perceive their inferences about discerning customers' quality assessments to b own choices. Finally, quality uncertainty must be salient, and an inference rule
We note that one might make an economic signaling argument for why quality inferences is "rational" if only high quality sellers find it profitable to pu advantaged group. However, it is not our purpose to advance a model o inferences will play a small part in decisions if consumers have other diagnostic judging quality, but can dominate decisions if uncertainty is high (Alba and Chakravarti, and Biehal 1990; Johar and Simmons, 2000; Kardes 1988 would not provide such a promotion. On the other hand, a high quality seller might benefit from such a subsidy because discerning buyers might purchase after they inspect the merchandise but perceived to be a ality prior to visiting the store and without observing the purchase behavior of the quality-discerning customers.
However, this signal would lose credibility if the advantaged group had no special ability to determine quality by inspection after they arrived at the store. Thus, we hypothesize that this promotion would attract excluded customers -our respondents --if the beneficiaries were seller's better treatment of another group of consu
In Study 1, our respondents are ineligible for a promotion that is offered subsidize another group's travel costs to visit the store. We vary whether the (a) especially able to discern quality from inspection or (b) has no special expe store's merchandise, and consequently might try to infer quality in order to deci incur a search cost to travel to the store.
Specifically, respondents might reason that the discerning buyers would after they arrived if the store carried low quality merchandise. Consequently, a prefer some less risky store without the subsidy. Thus this promotion could be Overview and Design. Two hundred and fifteen undergraduate and graduate students responded to a scenario in which they were to buy a specific crystal product available at two ality, and the other level of quality.
The quality sold at the latter store U was equally likely to be worth $70 more or $70 less than the quality sold at store C. In the experimental conditions, store U offered a promotion to another group that excluded the participants. The promotion was in the form of free transportation to store U; the free ride did not require any purchase once one arrived at the store. We manipulated group had no special ex ness and idiosyncratic fit.
We also manipulate the cost of the free ride given to the target group. A greater expense thus enhances the credibility and diagnosticity of the quality consequently making the store more attractive to our (novice) respondents (cf.
Wright 1989). However, we predict that giving the more costly, extravagant free intera ive. In contrast, extant fairness and idiosyncratic fit theories would predi benefits to another group should always repel excluded consumers. Respondents were randomly assigned to five conditions of a 2 (expert vs. non-expert targ read the same e short end of the stick" in that they were ineligible for superior treatment offered to another group. For the four treatment groups, participants assigned to the 'experts get free ride' condition read that, 'The pro held in the hotel.'
The promotion is given to 100 hotel guests who stay in harbor view rooms'; the respondents were told that they were staying in 'the standard city view room.'
In the standard promotion condition, the advantaged group receiving the free ferry ride would be sitting in the regular, non air-conditioned deck -the same accommodations as the the free ride. Par chase at Store U.
We told respondents that travel to the non-promoting store C would co that offers free transportation to the other group of customers; responses preference for store U. Prior to that ques ceptions of the target group's ability to discern quality relative to their ow et group benefits from promotion) x 2 (luxury vs. standard ride for the promotion recipients) completely between-participants design, augmented with a control group that scenario with no mention of a free ride for any group.
In all conditions except for the control condition, the participants "got th motion is given to 100 attendees to a conference on gemstone and geology Participants assigned to the 'non-experts get free ride' condition read that, ' Figure 1 shows that the WTP means under the 5 con with our predictions. Collapsing across ert group reduced willingness to pay to travel to Store U in compariso
Ignoring the control group and analyzing the remaining cells as a significant interaction effect between the identity of the ______________________________ t here ______________________________ Dis pondents were willing to pay more to visit a store of uncertain quality when another group received a free ride for which participants were ineligible. This occurred when members of the group being targeted ves. Our result is ve been predicted by inequity aversion, fairness, and the idiosyncratic fit h n to make positive inference about quality.
Further supporting the quality signaling explanation, the more luxurious the treatment to o shop at the store ing, drinks, and sna y should exacerbate envy and unfairness. But heaping favor on the other group actually increased respondents' willingness to pay because the more costly form of favoritism strengthens the quality signal.
ecial treatment, r than if the nonent with several extant theories concerning the respondents' perceptions of the promotion such as jealousy or envy (Feinberg et al., 2002) , unfairness perception (Campbell, 1999; Corfman and Lehmann, 1993; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Novemsky and Schweitzer, 2004) , and a heuristic of misfit (Kivetz and Simonson 2003) . Alternatively, respondents may have inferred a decrease in the more to get the same benefit as another group. In the remaining experiments, we did not specify the identity of the advantaged group. Nor do our respondents have to pay more for the core product and promotion bundle. Instead, our respondents get the short end of the stick because they pay the same price as another group but receive lower utility for the bundle due to the fact er the benefits given the target group (e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 1989) .
Our interest is not in distinguishing between these various alternative e why consumers were put off by better treatment of another group. It is clea
Our results also qualify the premise that promotions in general wil quality inference (cf. Chernev and Carpenter, 2001 ; Lichtenstein et al. 1 2004). As we expected, ratings of quality perceptions were higher in the SD=1.80) do not ncratic misfit may have reduced their interest in buying from the seller, without changing efs about quality.
In Study 1, we specified the identity of the advantaged group and man credibility of the quality signal. Participants got the short end of the stick beca that the promotion benefits an unspecified-but-imagined others more than themselves. Simonson e core product.
mer choice, consumers product that provides a benefit that other customers enjoy more or costs other customers less.
In Studies 2 and 3 we examine a situation similar to the collector's plate experiment of motional offer tion differs from of the core brand is likely to dominate respondents' concerns about the fit of the promotion to their personal tastes.
Consequently, our respondents may benefit more from making an effortful quality inference if is highly uncertain and consumers are ciated with a p of customers perceived to have superior ability to judge the quality of the core product.
However, if consumers believe that the product options are comparable in quality or they uality, we expect e relative fit of the promotion premium to their own tastes. We know from the literature that customers are not always overly concerned about quality and thus will not always think spontaneously about the implications of a promotion for core product quality. There is abundant evidence that consumers make certain kinds of inferences when explicitly prompted that they do not make in the absence et al. (1994) argue that such a promotion gives the consumer a reason to reject th Kivetz and Simonson (2003) argue that since fit is a major driver of consu will avoid a Simonson et al. (1994) . As in their studies, a core product is bundled with a pro and there is uncertainty concerning the core product's utility. However, our situa theirs in that we focus on conditions where uncertainty about objective quality quality is salient.
This leads to the following prediction. When quality concerned with determining this quality level, they will prefer a product asso promotion that is an idiosyncratic misfit for themselves but a fit for another grou do not entertain the possibility that promotions might be a cue to core product q that their choices of a product + premium bundle will be primarily driven by th of a prompt (Dick, Chakravarti and Biehal 1990; Feldman and Lynch 1988; Huber and McCann 198 imilar camcorders condition, neither camcorder was associated with any promotion. In experimental conditions, one product was associated with a promotion that was in general more attractive to (novice) respondents; the other to more s associated with which een camcorders. We manipulated salience by whether choice of the bundle preceded or followed having the participants make an explicit judgment of the relative quality of the two core products. This man in prior research amine more subtle ferences.
in parallel to effects of the fairness or fit of the promotion premium. Thus, if the quality of the two core products is salient to the decision, individuals will use inferences based on the promotion premiums to help lity. The high quality implication of the una is not salient, we would expect promotions that have a high personal fit to respondents' tastes to be more motivating than those that fit another (unmentioned) group of experts better.
Method
Overview, stimuli and design. One hundred and forty-six undergraduates were paid $1 to 2; Simmons and Lynch 1991) .
In Study 2, we asked respondents to choose between two somewhat s that varied on both comparable and non-comparable attributes. In a control product was associated with a promotion that would be relatively more attractive knowledgeable camcorder buyers. We varied both which camcorder wa promotion and the salience of core product quality at the time of choice betw ipulation mirrors similar prompted v. unprompted inference manipulations (e.g., Dick et al. 1990; Huber and McCann 1982) . In Studies 4 and 5, we ex manipulations that affect consumers' propensity to make spontaneous quality in
We claim that inferences about core product quality will operate them decide which core product has higher qua ttractive premium would outweigh its low direct benefit. However, if quality respond to a scenario in which they were to choose between two hypothetical camcorders (brand 
LTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
We test our theoretical perspective against the alternative explanation that individuals y 3, one promotion. If all promotions signal low quality (Chernev and Carpenter 2001) , respondents should choose the camcorder with the Seagate hard drive less often than in a control condition in which neither camcorder is promoted. The same should be true if a low-fit promotion is a reason against choice due to idiosyncratic misfit (Simonson et al. 1994) . In contrast, we predict a positive quality the personally attractive Wal-Mart gift certificate. We would like to be able consumers were attracted by the short end of the stick. That is, they preferre offered a promotion attractive Chernev and Carpenter, 2001) , whereby consumers infer that sellers would n unless core product quality was inferior; the more inferior the core produ the promotion the seller must offer to compensate. We pitted a camcorder lity; perhaps it is simply a less negative signal than the Wal-Mart gift c
STUDY 3: TEST OF A "COMPENSATORY INFERENCE" A
infer product quality to be inversely related to the value of a promotion. In Stud camcorder offers a Seagate hard drive promotion, but the alternative has no inference and choice for the product bundled with the Seagate rebate compared to no rebate y is non-salient individuals should be repelled by the ncratically misfitting promotion.
Me
Eighty-three undergraduates were paid $1 for participation. They compared two camcorder offers identical to those used in Study 2 with one exception: The Supersonic the Simmons aining 43, the as crossed with a 2-level quality salience manipulation. As in Study 2, respondents in the quality salient condition rated camcorder quality before being asked to choose between the two camcorders (or one -salient condition, ndents chose before rating camcorder quality. Respondents were randomly assigned to the fou scales as in Study But an alternative interpretation is that our findings are a laboratory artifact. In studies 2 and 3, we observed that people were attracted by the short end of the stick only when asked to make an explicit quality judgment prior to choosing between options and not otherwise. Since
Results
Insert Table 2 abou cussion of Study 3
The above results from Study 3 support our quality signaling accoun people to have a lower preference for Simmons when it was promoted t especially if quality is made salient. We find the opposite.
The design of Study 3 conceptually replicates Simonson et al. (199 consumer's personal taste can discourage the consumer from buying the associ
In contrast, we showed in Study 3 that adding such a promotion can attract cu lity of the core brand is salient and the promotion is one that would appe consumers who are perceived to be better judges of core product quality. How
We intend our manipulation of whether inferences were prompted prior represent a general class of events in the real world that cause people to reflec quality. For example, advertising can prime the dimension of quality, or a sal people rarely choose between products only after some external prompt to infer quality, the al-world consumers will make the effo ntaneously (i.e., without prompting) when choices have real consequences. We noted before that people do not make inferences unless it is instrumental to do so (Dick, Chakravarti and Biehal 1990; Feldman and Weiner 1981) . If who has multiple , and needs' (Fiske and Taylor 1991, p. 13) -then people should be more to be attracted by the short end of the stick if the stakes are high. The question then becomes, "Do real and material consequences mo inferences. We contrast the effect of promotion premiums when the choice is hypothetical versus when the same choice has real consequences. Our key prediction is that participants in the real choice condition wil ies a high quality . This would show that consumers make spontaneous quality inferences, leading them to be attracted by promotions with low idiosyncratic fit to their own tastes.
In Study 4, the core products are two cordless drills each priced near $100. In the control condition, there is no mention of accompanying promotions. In four experimental conditions, results of Studies 2 and 3 leave open the question of whether re rt to infer high product quality from receiving the short end of the stick.
In Study 4, we test the conjecture that consumers will infer quality spo and Lynch 1988; Ross and Creyer 1992; Simmons and Lynch 1991; Wong one views the consumer as a "motivated tactician" --'a fully engaged thinker cognitive strategies available and chooses among them based on goals, motives tivate quality inference in the natural process of choice?"
STUDY 4: HYPOTHETICAL VERSUS REAL CHOICES
Participants in Study 4 chose without being prompted for explicit quality l choose the product bundle accompanied by a promotion premium that impl core product even when that promotion premium has very little appeal to them one drill is paired with a $15 department store gift card promotion and the other is paired with a ants would prefer he gift card in the the chance to win the drill they choose (and its accompanying promotion), they will look for cues to determine which drill is higher quality. Thus, they will favor the drill that is bundled with the book targeted to b s. Design. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 6 conditions in a 3 (promotions) x 2 (real vs. hypothetical choice) between participants design. The promotion variable had three levels. In the no-promotion control condition, participants chose between the niche book targeted to builders. We expect that the vast majority of the particip the department store gift card to the book and thus pick the drill bundled with t hypothetical choice condition. In contrast, we expect that if participants have uilders, a promotion premium that does not appeal to their personal taste
Method
Participants. Three hundred and fourteen daytime MBA students part donation of $8 to a charity supported by that MBA program. Table 3a .
and those of your classmates, we will randomly draw a winner who will r he or she selected. If you are the winner, you will have the option to exc f its retail price. (You will als ts in the hypothetical choice c
Insert Table 3 about here ___________________________ Procedure. We first measured participants' knowledge of nine brand the following page of the booklet, participants read motion bundles they would prefer to receive as a free gift.
Then participants in the real choice conditions read the paragraph on th Effects of promotions on choice. Our key hypothesis states that when the choice is hypothetical, the promotions will cause respondents to favor bundles with the personally-favored Nordstrom gift card promotion; however, when the choice has real consequences, people will for the two promotion premiums (1=definitely prefer book, 8=definitely pre estimated the prices of the two drills on an 11-point scale (1=$50-$70, 11=$250 participants filled in information on their gender and country of origin. At the e he had chosen.
Results

Control Group ratings of drill attractiveness and promotion attractiven
control groups, the book and gift card promotions were evaluated alone rather th bundled with a drill. We found no difference between the two control groups in drew from the promotions. In the real choice conditions, because people are motivated to make spontaneous quality inferences, we predicted a higher estimated price for the drill paired with the book compared to the drill paired with the gift card. This prediction was supported. Both Skil and Ridgid were estimated to be higher in price when they were paired with the less preferred ore knowledgeable consumers and thus signals high quality.
We tested this hypothesis by focused comparisons among the four ce promotions accompanied the drills. First we used a binary logit analysis wh predicted, we find a significant interaction, χ (1, n=211) = 27.48, p<0.01. In t choice condition, the drill paired with the preferred promotion (gift card) was drill paired with the less preferred promotion (book), and this difference was less preferred promotion (the book) was chosen over the drill paired with the promotion (the gift card). on when one should expect buyers to be attracted by getting the short end of th 2 and 3, only participants for whom quality was made salient were attracted b tivated to use the promotions to make spontaneous quality inferences.
hypothetical, we observed choices more in line with prior work on idiosyn promotion that they disliked, but that appealed to experts. However, other analyses that we omit l choices, but s that participants sly in the process of choice. In contrast, participants did draw spontaneous inferences as a basis for real choice.
We intentionally allowed the winning participant to exchange his chosen drill for cash.
xpense of aspects t question the re not making the "naïve" external validity claim that people choosing drills in the real world will choose according to our quality signaling account, or that our results imply that idiosyncratic fit applies only to eptual 999). The 4 is that any internal or external factor that highlights con ility for consumers to be attracted by getting the short end of the stick. Real consequences for consumers cause them to infer core product quality spontaneously.
ect others to share a common definition of quality. Still, one might wonder whether the Study 4 results would generalize if respondents could not exchange their choice for cash. One might also question whether the effect in Study 4 has to do with the lesser fit of the Nordstrom gift card with the core product category (drill). Finally, one may wish for evidence supporting our claimed role of due to space constraints show that price estimates were unrelated to hypothetica significantly predicted real choices made earlier in the experiment. This implie in the hypothetical choice condition did not draw these inferences spontaneou
This instruction was meant to motivate respondents to attend to quality at the e of the drills where different people would have different preferences. One migh consequences of this decision for the external validity of our findings. 5 We a hypothetical choices. We claim external validity in the sense of identifying conc background factors that moderate a (promotion) treatment effect (Lynch 1982, 1 conceptual point of Studies 2, 3, and sumers' uncertainty about vertical dimensions of quality creates the possib
The above discussion pertains to situations in which consumers exp uncertainty about vertical quality vs. the value of horizontally differentiating features. Study 5 addressed these concerns.
CHOICES
Our quality-signaling account applies to markets where consumers perceive there is great variation in vertical product quality. Conversely, we expect idiosyncratic fit effects to dominate y uncertainty is r horizontal features that appeal to the idiosyncratic tastes of consumers.
dy 5 we manipulate the degree to which the products are believed to vary on quality. All The key dependent variables are the option chosen and graded preference for the two ence in judging quality of MP3 players and headphones for MP3 players. Then they rated their familiarity with eight brands of MP3 players and six brands of headphones. In the four experimental (promotion)
conditions, participants were told that 'the promotion premium, in the form of a free issue of a magazine, is currently given to accompany the purchase of the specific headphone model.' Then dphones.
Design. The design had certain similarities to Study 4, but all participants m choices, and we varied uncertainty about vertical quality attributes of the headp
In the no-promotion control condition, participants chose between the two he neither of them gave a promotion premium. In the 'Sony+ Entertainment Wee Sound&Vision' condition, the Sony headphone offered a free issue of Enterta
In the low quality differential condition, participants were truthfully info Choice of Sony v. Etymotic. We report the choice results in Figure 2 as a system of planned contrasts. First, considering just the control conditions, choices were unaffected by whether the vertical quality differential was portrayed as high (48% choosing Sony) or low (55% choosing Sony).
Design section above.
All the participants were informed that they had a 1/36 chance of receiv they chose. Pa were asked to express their strength of preference (1=slightly prefer the o fer the one I chose). The two questions give us the two key dependent varia (binary) and graded preference (1=definitely prefer Sony, 14=definitely p sonal attraction) and how appealing each of the magazines is to consumers w knowledgeable about headphones for portable music players (1=very un
Results
Manipulation check. We claim that respondents will infer that Sound Participants who were less knowledgeable had stronger relative preference for E Weekly over t here ______________________________ e accompanied by rential and promotion pairing supports our predictions, χ (1, n=158) = 14.4, p<0.0001. As predicted, when consumers believe that quality differential is low relative to idiosyncratic preference, they choose promotions that might appeal to experts.
The ekly and 41%
However, when the respondents were told that the quality differential was high, we found exactly the opposite pattern. The percent choosing Sony was 37% when it was paired with Ent 2 , n=79)= 7.69, otion was
Graded preferences. We repeated the same analysis on the 14-point graded preference measures (1=strongly prefer Sony, 14 = strongly prefer Etymotic) and the same pattern emerged.
s of effects of core product quality perceptions and promotion preference on choice, we find that when quality differential was high, graded preferences were driven by perceptions of the differential appeal of the two promotion magazines to knowledgeable headphone users and not by personal preferences. The opposite was true when the quality differential was low. bundles with promotions they like rather than ones with percent choosing Sony was 71% when it was paired with Entertainment We when it was paired with Sound&Vision, χ 2 (1, n=79)= 6.76, p<0.01.
ertainment Weekly and 69% when it was paired with Sound&Vision, χ (1 p<0.01. People were attracted by idiosyncratic misfit because the misfitting prom appealing to those more able to judge quality.
Moreover, similar to our Study 2 analyse
GENERAL DISCUSSION
hed that a but on whether ers (e.g., Feinberg et al., 2002; Kivetz and Simonson, 2003) . A large body of research has shown that people are repelled when sellers offer another group a better deal. The five studies reported in this article esta r that gives them a n exclusive benefit to another group for two reasons. First there is the effect of the utility of the deal itself or its unavailability. The envy and idiosyncratic fit accounts predict that consumers experience they incur that are t by signaling the quality of the core product. Consumers' inferences about core product quality can be positive or negative, dep nding greater when ratic Misfit nsumer's primary er, sometimes the source of a consumer's uncertainty arises predominantly from concern about his or her ability to judge core product quality by direct inspection. Here, a promotion that that appears to be targeted to dissimilar but expert others would lead the uncertain consumer to infer that the core product being promoted should also be good for this consumer. Consumers are attracted by a Prior research on fairness and envy and on idiosyncratic fit has establis consumer's utility for an option depends not just on its absolute characteristics, the customer is getting a better or worse deal than some other group of custom blish the contingencies under which consumers can be attracted by an offe comparative disadvantage.
We noted above that consumers might react to a seller's offer of a disutility from a benefit that another group gets but they do not or from costs less for others. Second, an exclusive deal can also have an effec e on the circumstances. The magnitude of this inference effect will be consumers are uncertain about quality and quality differences are important.
Boundary Conditions for Attraction by Idiosyncratic Fit vs. Idiosync
In the work on reason-based choice and idiosyncratic fit, the co concern is about the fit of a product to his or her own personal tastes. Howev promotion that offers less benefit to themselves than to the targeted experts, contrary to what by inspection need ult to follow.
ch, the mere offer by the seller to the expert group is perceived by novice buyers as a signal of product quality.
All the studies reported herein include conditions in which the seller offers better quality. In Study 1, hat group's ion of another segment of customers and thus our respondents needed to imagine some comparison group. In all of our studies, we were able to produce results that were compatible with prior findings that l of our studies also signal of quality; here r group of buyers. 
Behavioral versus Rational Models
In this article, we have relied on behavioral rather than analytic models to argue that consumers may sometimes be attracted by offering them a worse deal than another group. We idiosyncratic fit would have predicted. Consumers unable to discern quality not observe the purchase or non-purchase of the more expert group for this res
Under certain boundary conditions that we have explored in this resear treatment to a group perceived to be superior to respondents at discerning we explicitly mentioned the target group and respondents registered cues about t relative ability to discern quality. In Studies 2-5, there was no explicit ment consumers are repelled by being disadvantaged by a promotion. However, al demonstrate conditions where the promotion was perceived to be a useful the disadvantaged group was attracted to the seller who was targeting anothe Specifically, these misfitting promotions seem to be particularly useful when er incurred a great cost if the product was not attractive to the discerning and when product quality is made salient either by external factors (Studies 2 have not taken a position on whether choosing a product that gives the consumer the short end of shown only that suc courage elaboration.
ytically the conditions needed for the signals used in our experiments to be credible. This would require
showing that only high quality sellers would find it profitable to provide such a promotion.
Thu ose a product even al" in making quality inferences, sellers may want to use promotions similar to those used in our studies if they believe novices will perceive them to be useful signals of quality. For instance, many investors promotions that would financial aluate electronics are upgrades where current owners would take the role of experts. For those promotions to be perceived as credible quality signals, the seller would need to ascertain that the novice buyers viewed the promotions to be too costly (unprofitable) for low quality sellers to offer them. the stick is "rational" buyer behavior or some simplifying heuristic. We have h inferences have stronger effects on choice under conditions that en
Future work might attempt a game-theoretic analysis that shows anal s, novice consumers would be making a rational inference when they cho though they are getting the short end of the stick.
Finally, we note that regardless of whether or not consumers are "ration find financial offerings hard to evaluate. One could envision providing only appeal to very knowledgeable investors in order to signal the quality of the product. Other situations that come to mind are the promotion of hard to ev and softw 3 The premium was correctly described to subjects as having be featuring USB2.0 and Firewire interfaces, 72000 rpm and an 8MB buffer. A 4 drills were not bundled with promotion premiums.
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